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Abstract
During the past decade there has been a proliferation of sports stadia being built in America’s municipal districts. While
it used to be common for the public to fully fund stadium construction projects, over the past 20 years factors such as
political motives, tax reform, and increased public awareness of tax equity have forced sports teams to share increasing
amounts of the financial burden (Crompton, Howard, & Var, 2003). As public funding for stadia construction has
decreased, franchises have continued to strive for maximized profits. Concurrently, the cost of attending events in
sports stadia has increased for consumers in terms of higher ticket prices even though changes in fixed costs should not
affect pricing (Leeds & von Allmen, 2004).
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between the use of public funds to build stadia and the
profit maximizing goals of National Football League (NFL) franchises. A hypothesis was formulated that stated the
impact of the public share of the construction cost would have no effect on relative ticket prices for those that consume
the product. The cross-sectional data for a ticket price model, which consisted of seasonal data from every NFL team
to play from 1991 through 2003, was investigated. The results showed an increase in public funding by 10% lowers tick-
et prices by 42 cents. As shown, the bulk of the variation in ticket prices was due to a general increase over time and
MSA per capita income. 
Keywords: National Football League, public finance, stadia, ticketing
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During the past decade there has been a proliferation of
new sports stadia in America’s municipal districts. While it
used to be common for the public to fully fund stadium
construction projects, over the past 20 years political
motives, tax reform, and increased public awareness of tax
equity have forced sports teams to share increasing
amounts of the financial burden to construct stadia and
arenas (Crompton, Howard, & Var, 2003). Yet despite
these factors, public money still continues to support
approximately 55% of stadium costs (Broughton, 2004).
Even when these public funds were used, sport franchises,
like most private sector firms, have focused on maximizing
shareholder wealth as they strive for maximized profits.
Several forms of public subsidy have been used in the
construction of stadia and arenas, from the use of public
funds (tax dollars) to build stadia and arenas to the
reduction or elimination of property taxes on privately
owned facilities. Fort (2004b), in his paper Subsidies as
Incentive Mechanisms in Sports, examined the relation-
ship between public subsidies and ticket prices. Here,
operating subsidies were examined. Fort found that an
inverse relationship existed between stadium operating
subsidies and ticket pricing in single-use stadia. 
In his article, Fort (2004b) divided subsidies into two
categories—construction subsidies and operating subsi-
dies. He stated that construction subsidies included both
direct and indirect tax and infrastructure subsidies while
operating subsidies included subsidies granted to team
owners in stadium lease agreements. In this current
paper, the subsidy examined was the use of public funds,
a tax subsidy, to build new venues. This would be classi-
fied by Fort as a construction-based subsidy.
Factors Influencing the Use of Public Funds
for Sport Venues
Political Motives
Legislators, like politicians at every level, run according to
agendas, most of which are determined in the election
process. According to Brunori (2001), ambition has guid-
ed the motives of state legislators. Once in office, these
legislators have focused on reelection, attempted to
enhance their political reach, and hoped to further their
political careers. It can therefore be assumed that legisla-
tors will work hard to advance their agendas, a notion
supported by Brunori. With regard to tax policy, the
author noted that policy is formulated to advance both
public policy and political goals. If these goals have the
potential to enhance a legislator’s standing with an
important special interest group, public policy and polit-
ical goals have often intersected. 
One potential interest, the sport team owner, has
become powerful within local political and business com-
munities. Some politicians have utilized this power dur-
ing elections, and upon taking office seek support for the
public funding of sports stadia (Crompton, Howard, &
Var, 2003). The most common public mechanism to
raise the capital needed to fund a stadium has been the
sales tax, presumably because of its obscurity. This source
of funding has been used because politicians attempt to
obscure an individual’s tax burden by passing increases in
taxes that are mostly unnoticed by their constituents
(Brunori, 2001). As such, the author noted that the sales
tax is the easiest form of tax to hide. The sales tax is paid
in such small increments that the public is largely
unaware of its gross sales tax liability. 
As increases are frequently so small that the cost of
fighting them is too much for an individual person or
group to bear, sales tax increases have often received lit-
tle resistance from the public. Thomas R. Dye, in his the-
ory on public taxation acceptance, posed that special
interests look for the benefits, subsidies, and privileges
government can provide with the costs of these benefits,
subsidies, and privileges being born by all taxpayers. As
these costs are dispersed to a large number of individuals,
it was stated that very few feel that the added tax is worth
the time or money to oppose the benefit, subsidy or priv-
ilege granted to the special interest (Brown & Paul, 1999).
Occasionally, taxpayers have joined together to oppose
a benefit for a special interest. In Hamilton County,
Ohio, taxpayers fought a sales tax increase designed to
fund two new sports venues along Cincinnati’s riverfront.
The two stadia were funded through the use of a sales tax,
thus assuring that the costs of building the stadia would
be spread over as large a population as possible. To
counter opposition to the sales tax increase, the sales tax
increase was combined with a property tax rollback;
therefore, for property owners only, there was a net tax
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reduction (Brown & Paul, 1999). The Hamilton County
sales tax increase was so marginal to the millions affected
that few had the inclination, time, or resources to fight it
politically.
Additionally, politicians are forced to make decisions
concerning where tax revenue is spent. Often if they
chose to use tax revenue to fund one project, resources
were taken away from other projects. This has been
referred to as opportunity cost. Crompton, Howard, and
Var (2003) defined opportunity costs in sport as benefits
that would be received if public resources committed to a
sporting facility were redirected for other use. Within the
political process, however, opportunity costs have been
often ignored when determining where funds are spent. 
To understand the concept of opportunity costs in
public administration, Crompton, Howard, and Var
(2003) discussed the differences between capital and
operating budgets. Importantly, funds from capital and
operating budgets cannot be directly substituted. Those
that advocate additional funds for education, public safe-
ty, and public health rather than funds for a sporting
venue look to a city’s operating budget for increased sup-
port. To solve the fiscal problems for the social programs
listed above, permanent acceptance of higher tax rates
has been required. It has usually been easier to convince
voters to support increases in taxes for capital projects,
such as stadia, where tax increases are almost always tem-
porary. Further, as operating budgets are not approved
by a public vote, resulting tax changes will be linked to
those in office at the time of election. Operating budgets
also increase incrementally, and thus are ongoing and
likely to increase. Capital investments, however, have a
fixed timeframe determined by a bond’s maturity.
The differences between operating and capital budgets
have explained some of the political incentives for advo-
cating stadium funding. In addition, as Crompton,
Howard, and Var (2003) stated, public subsidies for sport
venues frequently come from non-residents (hotel/motel
tax, car rental tax) while items in operating budgets are
funded primarily by the community taxpayer. As politi-
cians are driven by results and constituents can visually
see the impact of stadium construction, the physical
improvements can be equated as progress. For social pro-
grams, it has been much harder to measure progress by
pointing to tangible results; therefore, progress in these
areas often has been overlooked. 
Even though political motives can drive the push for
increased public funding in capital projects, the use of tax
revenue must still be justified. According to Crompton,
Howard, and Var (2003), these capital expenditures must
show a positive return on investment. Additionally, the
investment in the capital project must return an amount
at least equal to other capital projects in which the gov-
ernment could have invested. Therefore, if a municipali-
ty decided to fund a sports stadium, it needed to be able
to justify the benefits of such a project. Baade (1996) stat-
ed decisions to subsidize a sports stadium force either
delays or reductions in other needed capital projects, or
force a community to increase their total tax burden to
support all needed projects.
Tax Reform
Despite the prowess of many politicians, stadium tax
levies have faced increasing resistance from the public.
According to Baade and Dye (1990), operating deficits in
publicly owned, or financed, stadia have led to taxpayer
resistance in communities proposing new funding for new
sporting venues. In San Francisco, the citizens have voted
down a number of proposals that would have created
public funding mechanisms for new stadia to be used by
the San Francisco Giants (baseball) and 49ers (football). 
In addition to the faltering financial status of existing
stadiums, tax reform has added to the external pressures
facing public budgeters. In Dubuque, Iowa, voters
resoundingly voted down a stadium bond issue that
would have been used to partially fund the construction of
a new baseball facility (Stiles, 2004). In Minnesota, the
Saint Paul City Council voted 4-2 to reject a public fund-
ing proposal to build a ballpark and attract the Twins
(baseball) out of Minneapolis (Associated Press, 2004).
The two tax reforms that have affected the public fund-
ing of sport venues both were passed during the Reagan
administration. The first, the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, ended the use of tax-exempt bonds to finance luxu-
ry boxes, and the second, the Tax-Reform Act of 1986,
prohibited the use of tax-exempt bonds for sports facilities
if more than 10 percent of its revenue came from one ten-
ant. With the elimination of their tax exemption, the cost
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of financing stadia through the offering of bonds
increased; therefore, municipalities were forced to find
other means to help defer the cost. At the same time,
municipalities increased the use of “load shedding,” where
costs were shifted from the public sector and absorbed by
private entities (Crompton, Howard, & Var, 2003). As a
result, many sports teams now had to incur a portion of
the cost of constructing new facilities. Though public/pri-
vate funding partnerships began to appear with some reg-
ularity, most stadium projects consisted of sport
franchises contributing a substantial, but minority, share
of the facility’s cost. This shared cost approach was more
widely accepted by the public and helped politicians con-
tinue to accommodate sport franchises.
Equity in Taxation
Inherently, taxation has been viewed negatively by the
public as it reduces personal income. However, taxation
has been necessary in modern society. The primary issue
in taxation has not been the tax itself, but the fairness of
the tax. According to Mikesell (2002), tax policy has been
formulated to cause the least amount of economic harm
as taxes move available resources from private use, there-
by harming the private sector. Therefore, a socially
acceptable tax would collect as much revenue as possible
for government operations while leaving ample resources
for private sector use.
When evaluating tax policy, equity has been the major
thrust. Mikesell (2002) stated that there were two general
standards of equity. The first was benefits received.
Taxpayers have examined tax equity based upon the
direct benefits from, or usage of, the public service fund-
ed via the tax. The second standard of equity was the abil-
ity to pay. Here, the author stated the taxpayer evaluates
equity based upon his or her ability to bear the burden of
the tax. For example, when examining a tax on gasoline,
the benefits received approach to evaluating equity could
be used. The purchaser of the gasoline would determine
the level of taxation by the amount gasoline he or she
consumed and then relate the taxation amount to road
improvements, a public service funded by the gasoline
tax. The tax would be evaluated based upon the percep-
tion of the benefits received. Using the ability to pay
approach, the purchaser would evaluate the tax based
upon the perceived amount of tax burden he or she felt
that he or she could pay. 
The benefits based approach has been criticized, howev-
er. Mikesell (2002) stated that today’s governments have
attempted to redistribute wealth when providing social
services. Services have been provided which transfer (net)
income from one group to another. Here the benefits
received approach has failed as the objective of taxation is
subsidization rather than exchange. Although impractical
in some situations, the ability to pay method has had
wider appeal. As Mikesell described, the market-exchange
philosophy can be found in this approach as, regardless of
service, those capable of bearing the costs of government
should bear the greatest amount of those costs.
Mikesell (2002) described two additional forms of equi-
ty that have been used to further evaluate methods of tax-
ation. Horizontal and vertical equity have been commonly
used standards to measure the fairness of a tax across and
within social segments. Horizontal equity, or the equal
treatment of taxpayers with the same capability to pay
taxes, has been supported in the Supreme Court in regard
to property taxes. Further, the court’s ruling has been
extended to similar forms of taxation. When applying the
concept of vertical equity, the relationship between the
taxes paid by individuals with different abilities to pay is
examined. Importantly, vertical equity measures the asso-
ciation between effective rates of taxation and income.
Taxation equity has been an issue in sport stadia
financing on two accounts. The first was the vertical equi-
ty of the tax and the second was the equity of tax revenue
allocation. According to Crompton, Howard, and Var
(2003), when examining public resources, one must
examine who gets the resources, and even who should get
the resources. In the public funding of stadia, taxpayer’s
dollars have been used to pay for the construction of sta-
dia that primarily house sports franchises owned by mil-
lionaires. Therefore, the public has transferred income
from the community to a small group of wealthy owners.
Further, if not to enhance the inequity of the relationship,
sports franchises charged consumers to watch games
despite receiving a substantial public subsidy.
The issue of inequity in the funding of public stadia has
been hotly debated. While municipalities have attempted
to justify funding stadiums using the economic develop-
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ment argument, many have questioned the true value of
professional sports as a public good. Regardless of the
argument, without these subsidies, the prevalent but
inequitable practice of transferring resources from the
ordinary taxpayer to the wealthy owner would end.
However, the inequity of resource allocation would con-
tinue as long as the public funds any form of capital proj-
ect, whether sport related or not. While some cases may
be more blatant than others, sports stadia typically have
garnered greater exposure and thus public funding for
such projects has been easier to scrutinize.
As discussed earlier, the original sales tax in Hamilton
County, Ohio, increased by one percentage point in the
county; however, the final proposed tax was reduced
when a property tax break was included in the ballot ini-
tiative. As reported by Brown and Paul (1999), the final
proposal ended with 70% of the tax revenue being used
to fund new stadia for the Reds (baseball) and Bengals
(football) and 30% being used to offset the reduction in
local property taxes. This tax proved, however, to be ver-
tically inequitable given the large proportion of renters
within the county.
Though passed by the community, the Hamilton
County tax proposal failed the vertical equity test by pro-
viding greater net tax relief to higher income earners pri-
marily based on their home ownership. According to
Brown and Paul (1999), homeowners earning over
$45,000 received a net tax reduction. Those earning less
than $27,000 had a net tax increase. Finally, homeowners
earning between $27,000 and $45,000 broke even when
the effects of the two tax changes were combined. As the
authors noted, there was a clear disparity between the
level of tax paid by lower income earners and the propor-
tion paid by higher income earners, and this disparity was
vertically inequitable. Michaud, a Cincinnati news writer,
was quoted by Brown and Paul as saying that the plan was
“a transfer of wealth from the poor to higher income
groups … we are in fact taking money from the little guy
… and transferring it to the millionaires” (p. 227).
Expenditure of Public Funds and Profit
Maximization
While the factors that ultimately affect public funding
decisions are debated and tax equity is measured, the
owners of sport organizations may view the operation of
their clubs as similar to the operation of other businesses
and seek financial gains, such as shareholder wealth max-
imization (Foster, Greyser, & Walsh, 2006). In the case of
a private business like a sport franchise, the shareholders
are company ownership. Essentially, the concept of prof-
it maximization has referred to increasing the profit
transferred to ownership. These goals have been widely
accepted by the business community and have been the
aim of most for-profit organizations. The sports industry
has been no different, in that team owners have attempt-
ed to maximize a combination of their personal wealth
and some aspect of winning (Brown & Paul, 1999).
Naturally, implications have arisen from this.
When outside forces, such as tax increases or increases
in stadium construction cost, pressure a business, owner-
ship has attempted to maximize its wealth by passing the
burden of these new expenses onto other elements of the
company. This process has been characterized in business
by a concept called shifting. Mikesell (2002) stated that
there were three ways a business may respond. First, in
forward shifting, a business will respond by increasing its
prices to reflect the new expense. Or, a business might
backward shift. Here a business will reduce the price paid
to the owners of the resources it purchases. It may also
reduce the wages paid to employees and the prices paid for
raw materials. Finally, a business might absorb the cost,
thereby returning a lower profit to its shareholders. As
most businesses utilize the profit-maximizing model, the
effect of increased taxes or increased capital expenditures
has been to shift the increased financial burden to the con-
sumer or employee. Tax decreases or a decrease in capital
expenditure, however, have been absorbed by sharehold-
ers in the form of increased profits or dividends.1
Based upon economic theory, however, there should be
no connection between increased or decreased capital
expenditures and costs to consumers. Therefore, there
should be no relationship between fixed cost, the cost of
constructing a new stadium, and marginal cost, the cost
of selling one more seat to the game (Leeds & von
Allmen, 2004). Stadium subsidies reduce an organiza-
tion’s fixed costs. But, stadium subsidies do not impact
the marginal costs of increasing attendance or revenues.
As marginal costs are not affected, there is no incentive
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for a profit maximizing organization to either lower price
if stadium subsidies are increased or raise price if stadium
subsidies are decreased.
Current public stadium financing trends have seen
sport owners accept a greater burden of the construction
and operational costs. Regardless of whether or not the
stadium capital investment was funded totally or partial-
ly by an incremental tax covering millions of people, in
the end the profit maximizing company will act in one of
two ways. First, according to Mikesell (2002), it may shift
as much of its own cost upon its customers, employees,
and suppliers. Crompton, Howard, and Var (2003)
added that teams without public funding have to com-
pensate by utilizing more of their revenue to repay annu-
al facility debt load. Second, there may be no impact on
pricing as economic theory dictates that changes in fixed
costs should not affect pricing (Leeds & van Allmen,
2004). The purpose of this study was to explore this
process in the National Football League (NFL) by exam-
ining the effect on consumer prices. A hypothesis was for-
mulated that stated the impact of the public share of the
construction cost would have no effect on relative ticket
prices for those that consume the product.
Data
A cross-sectional and time series ticket price model was
used in this study to test the hypothesis. The data used in
the model consisted of seasonal data from every NFL
team that played from 1991 through 2003. Included in
these data was information regarding each NFL stadium,
and variables that may describe fluctuations in ticket
pricing (see Table 1). In total there were 19 potential
explanatory variables that were determined by the review
of literature. Team Marketing Report published pricing
information on a yearly basis, and for the purpose of this
research, was the most reliable source for pricing data
(http://www.teammarketing.com/fci.cfm, 2004).
In order to develop an applicable model for NFL ticket
pricing, it was important to include the population and
per capita income of the market for each team. To
achieve this, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) data
were used. This data was taken from U.S. Census esti-
Table 1.  Simple Descriptive Statistics of the NFL Ticket Pricing Model
Variable N Minimum Mean Maximum Std. Dev.
Team Code 389 1 16.90745501 32 9.3814728
NFL Season 389 1991 1997.172237 2003 3.7400935
Stadium Capacity 389 41203 69672.66067 92000 8420.31896
Public Funding % 389 0 84.938560 100 28.3939990
Private Funding % 387 0 15.141860 100 28.4481039
Average Ticket Price 389 18.17 39.51 81.89 11.3377113
Fan Cost Index 389 124.68 229.66 438.54 58.6056087
FCI Adjusted for Inflation 389 168.44 260.00 468.59 48.7725123
Stadium Age 389 1 25.213368 82 17.9412910
Percent Capacity Sold 389 0.45 0.8925707 1.03 0.1137622
MSA Population 389 198527 4912434.8 2.15E+07 4930004.91
MSA Per Capita Income 389 21216 31438.298 59693 6285.76974
Season Winning % 389 0.063 0.5010540 0.938 0.1833635
Lagged Winning % 385 0.063 0.5012519 0.938 0.1846927
Expansion Year 389 0.0 0.0102828 1.0 0.1010112
Relocation Year 389 0.0 0.0154242 1.0 0.1233912
Shared MSA 389 0.0 0.1979434 1.0 0.3989624
Lagged Playoff Appearance 389 0.0 0.4010283 1.0 0.4907379
Lagged Super Bowl Win 389 0.0 0.0308483 1.0 0.1731293
Lagged Super Bowl Appearance 389 0.0 0.0616967 1.0 0.2409136
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mates. NFL teams likely draw fans from the city in which
they play and from the surrounding communities.
Therefore, MSA data had the potential to provide the
most applicable forecast of population (MSA Population)
as well as income variables (MSA Per Capita Income).
According to Rascher (1999), studies found income to be
a significant factor in determining attendance at sporting
events. The expected effect of increases in MSA popula-
tion and per capita income was an increase in the cost of
an NFL ticket. Further, the model utilized a dummy vari-
able to denote those NFL teams that share MSAs. The
model also utilized two dummy variables, Expansion
Year and Relocation Year, to control for trends related to
franchise movement. The model took the following form:
NFL Average Ticket Prices = f(season, capacity, public
share, stadium age, MSA income, average of lagged wins,
and current winning percent)
Team Marketing Report’s Fan Cost Index™ (FCI), a vec-
tor of prices that fans pay to attend sporting events, includ-
ed two adult average price tickets, two child average price
tickets, four small soft drinks, two small beers, four hot
dogs, two programs, parking, and two adult sized caps.
The first law of demand predicted that higher prices will
lead to lower levels of demand, ceteris paribus. The average
Fan Cost Index for attending one game was $229.60 for the
sample, with a low of $124.68 and a high of $438.59.
Winning percentage (Season Winning %) was expected
to be an important proxy for the quality of the home
team. The winning percentage in the year each season
began, seasons 1991 to 2003, was used. There were a
number of studies that found winning to be an important
determinant of attendance demand (Burdekin & Idson,
1991; McDonald & Rascher, 2000). Further, Martell and
Tehranian (1988) found that winning percentage impact-
ed the cost of a scalped ticket. As expected, the average
winning percentage was near 0.500
2
(at 0.501), with the
minimum at 0.063 and the maximum at 0.938. 
Lagged winning percentage (Lagged Winning %) was
also expected to affect demand because the previous sea-
son’s performance affected season ticket sales and the
appeal of early season games. For instance, Rascher
(1999) showed that in baseball an extra win by the home
team in the previous season increased per game atten-
dance by about 450 fans for the first half of the season,
but declined in magnitude, to 150 fans per game, and in
significance, for the second half of the season.
There were factors unrelated to the game itself that
could also act as forecasting tools such as those associated
with stadia. There was a presumed difference in ticket
prices associated with the level of public funding provided
for the construction of a stadium. Thus, the level of pub-
lic funding (Public Funding %) and the level of private
funding (Private Funding %) for each stadium was incor-
porated into the study. The average level of public fund-
ing support was 84.94 percent with a minimum value of
zero percent and a maximum value of 100 percent. 
There was also a presumed effect of stadium age upon
the desirability of attending an event (McEvoy, Nagel,
DeSchriver, & Brown, 2005). As a result stadium age
(Stadium Age) was included in the model. Finally,
instead of utilizing attendance as a factor, percent capac-
ity (Percent Capacity Sold) was deemed a more appropri-
ate measure as it allowed for meaningful comparison
between teams. Capacity (Stadium Capacity) was used as
well as overall supply was fixed and unchangeable.
Analysis and Results
A ticket-pricing model was developed to test the hypoth-
esis that the impact of the public share of the construc-
tion cost would have no effect on relative ticket prices for
those that consume the product. Typically, simultaneity
problems exist when trying to estimate models of prices
because price is simultaneously determined by supply
and demand. However, in this case supply was fixed and
unchangeable. An owner cannot change the capacity of
the stadium or the number of games played. In fact, the
many articles that estimate attendance relied on this
notion when introducing ticket price into the economet-
ric models. These issues are discussed in Fort (2004a).
Only if teams provide prices by number of seats available
at each price point and tickets sold at each price point will
there be a better method of estimation.
In addition to ticket price, the full cost of attendance
should be analyzed. However, there is no data on the full
cost of attendance other than what is estimated by a team’s
FCI. There is no reason to believe that travel costs (and
other costs) vary across teams in any systematic manner or
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vary according to the source of stadium financing. Thus,
these effects will be captured in the intercept term.
As described in the previous section, there were a num-
ber of variables in previous studies shown to have an
effect on ticket price. In this study, the time trend was
shown to have a great impact on average ticket price.
Based on the results shown in Table 2, average ticket
prices increased $2.07, or about 5%, each additional sea-
son when starting at the average ticket price. As predict-
ed, the quality of the team during the previous season
affected expected demand, and lagged winning percent-
age was very significant. However, season winning per-
centage was not significant. Different specifications of
season winning percentage and lagged winning percent-
age were tested, with season winning percentage never
being significant. By averaging season winning percent-
age with lagged winning percentage, the F-statistic of the
overall model improved (as compared to the model with
just lagged winning percentage), even though the t-statis-
tic on the average of season and lagged winning percent-
age was less than on lagged winning percentage alone. A
10 percentage point increase in the average of lagged and
season winning percentage was associated with a rise in
average ticket prices of 1%, or $0.63 on average.
Older stadiums had lower ticket prices. While statisti-
cally significant, the economic importance is minimal.
For each year older, average ticket prices were about
$0.05 lower. Additionally, wealthier MSAs had higher
ticket prices. For every $10,000 increase in MSA per capi-
ta income,
3
average ticket prices were approximately
$3.64 higher, ceteris paribus.
In determining if the impact of the public share of the
construction cost would not affect relative ticket prices
for consumers of the NFL product, the results proved
that the hypothesis was incorrect. An increase in public
funding by 10% lowered the average ticket price by
approximately $0.42 cents. As shown, the majority of the
variation in average ticket price was due to a general
increase over time and MSA per capita income. Further,
the negative relationship between ticket price and the
percentage of the stadium that was publicly financed was
masking the negative relationship between public financ-
ing and season. Over the past decade-and-a-half, ticket
prices rose and the percentage of public financing
declined, but most of the ticket price increase was
accounted for by simple increases in demand and infla-
tion, as well as MSA per capita income.
Finally, the analysis corrected for heteroscedasticity
using White’s robust errors. The Ramsey RESET test
showed no omitted variable bias, and the Shapiro-Wilk
test showed that each variable was normally distributed at
the less than 3% level. A variance inflation factor analysis
caused the removal of a few collinear variables (Lagged
Playoff Appearance, Lagged Super Bowl Win, Lagged
Super Bowl Appearance).
Brown, Rascher, Ward
Table 2.  Regression Results
Dependent Variable Average Ticket Prices
Number of Observations 385
F-statistic 191.7
Prob > F 0.0000
R-squared 0.691
Independent Variable Coefficient t-statistic P > |t|
Constant Term -4104.9 -12.13 0.000
Season 2.069 23.20 0.000
Capacity 0.000044 1.10 0.270
Public Share -0.0415 -2.81 0.005
Stadium Age -0.0455 -2.63 0.009
MSA Income 0.000364 7.55 0.000
Average of Lagged and Current WPCT 6.31 3.08 0.002
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Discussion and Conclusions
The findings did not support the hypothesis that higher
percentages of public stadium funding would have no
impact on ticket prices. However, the findings add to
Fort’s (2004b) study on subsidies as both have found that
an inverse relationship exists between ticket price and
subsidy, whether operating or construction. 
It must be noted that the impact of public funding of
stadia on the average ticket price of a team was small.
Average ticket prices have been increasing seasonally,
regardless of the composition of stadium funding. Given
that the average NFL stadium was almost 90 percent full
for every game, team owners have been able to increase
the price of tickets without significant negative impacts
on attendance. Therefore it can be assumed that ticket
price increases reflect an increase in the fan’s willingness
to pay over time.
The data indicated that on average there is a reduction
of $0.42 in ticket prices with a 10% increase in public
finding, thereby running counter to the notion from
Leeds and von Allmen (2004) that there is no incentive
for a profit-maximizing firm to lower prices if subsidies
are increased. It is possible that there are still some
important omitted variables, even though the diagnostic
tests showed otherwise, that would drive down the
impact of public funding to near zero. Further, the data
indicated that Mikesell (2002) and Crompton, Howard,
and Var (2003) were correct in that teams with a lower
percentage of public funding shift the burden of these
extra fixed costs to the consumer in order to generate rev-
enue for their increased fixed costs as compared to teams
with higher percentages of public funding.
As the results of this study are counter to economic the-
ory, it is possible that a team may charge lower prices as a
quid pro quo for the public paying for its stadium. There
even might be an implicit agreement between team and
city to do so when public funding is arranged. Fort
(2004b) found this to be true in regard to operating sub-
sidies. However, without such an agreement in place, it
would be assumed that teams would inherently price
optimally regardless of fixed costs like stadiums.
Another reason why the results of this study are count-
er to economic theory may be that a team is shifting price
increases to concessions, parking, and merchandise
instead of tickets because the public paid so much for the
stadium. This move would lessen public relations prob-
lems when it is reported that ticket prices increased as the
team moved into a new publicly funded stadium. Again
though, it would be assumed that teams would inherent-
ly price optimally regardless of fixed costs like stadiums.
This research has implications for municipalities con-
sidering stadium projects. New stadium projects are in
vogue, especially for cities hoping to reinvigorate down-
town regions. In 2005, it is estimated that $1.93 billion
will be spent to construct new sport venues in the United
States, with 55% of the costs being paid for with public
funding (Broughton, 2004). However, as previous
research has suggested, the economic impacts of new sta-
dia construction are mixed, with some cities seeing
promising results and others still hoping for positive
returns. For municipalities considering funding stadium
projects partially or fully, this research does support the
profit maximizing theory as it applies to sports team
owners. Local residents should not expect to have much
lower ticket prices if they vote to approve the use of pub-
lic funds to build a stadium, especially if they only vote to
approve the partial funding of a stadium. Average ticket
prices increased $2.07, or about 5%, each additional sea-
son when starting at the average ticket price. Again, it can
be assumed that ticket price increases reflect an increase
in the fan’s willingness to pay over time.
As the negative impact on ticket price by increase in per-
cent of public funding is small, the citizens of a municipal-
ity must decide the value of having a sports team in town,
and if this value outweighs the cost. When presented to
taxpayers as a referendum, these tax payers must measure
the benefits received, their ability to pay, horizontal equi-
ty, and vertical equity before agreeing to transfer wealth
from the masses to franchise shareholders.
The amount of public funding used has been shown to
be an issue between franchise owners and municipalities
over the last 20 years. When citizens decide that there is lit-
tle or no equity when presented with a new tax initiative,
franchise owners likely will seek different opportunities to
maximize profit. In the mid-1990s, Cleveland refused to
publicly fund a new stadium for the Browns (football). As
a result, Art Modell, the Browns’ owner, moved the team
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to Baltimore, where the city pledged to furnish Modell’s
team (now the Ravens) with a new publicly funded stadi-
um. The same occurred in Charlotte, where the communi-
ty refused to fund a new arena for the Hornets National
Basketball Association franchise. The Hornets moved to
New Orleans, where the promise of a new arena was used
to lure the team. In both of these cases, ownership sought
to improve their ability to generate revenue. Without the
burden of paying debt obligations on new facilities, both
teams are able to earn greater profits. 
Furthermore, when a municipality decides to publicly
fund a stadium project in the NFL, it will eliminate a large
portion of the fixed costs of a sport franchise. Franchises
may then use the reduction in their fixed expenses to
retain current players or sign free agents with up-front
signing bonuses (Brown, Nagel, McEvoy, & Rascher,
2004). The NFL’s Collective Bargaining Agreement
4
enables teams to circumvent (in the short term) the pres-
ent year’s salary cap by allocating the bonus to future
years (National Football League, 1998). 
Ultimately though, sports franchises are the least affect-
ed by stadia funding decisions. The cost of building or
renovating new stadia will be shifted to the consumers,
suppliers, and employees, but not ownership groups. 
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Endnotes
1
The profit-maximizing incentive to pass on costs in the form
of higher prices depends on whether the costs are fixed or vari-
able. The ability to pass on costs also depends on the elasticities
of both supply and demand.
2
For the last four seasons of the data set, there were an odd
number of teams in the NFL. Winning percentage will not
exactly equal .500 due to ties that are a possible outcome of a
game in a league with an odd number of teams.
3
In a comparison of F-statistics, it is better to have MSA
income instead of MSA population. Using wealth (MSA popu-
lation*MSA income) has a lower F-statistic and R2 in general.
Therefore, it is not a solution to collinearity.
4
During the last six years, which was the timeframe for this
study, the 1998 CBA was in effect.
